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Notes and Comments
WAYNE K. TALLEY

Financing Port Dredging Costs: Taxes
versus User Fees
Ships, particularly containerships, continue
to grow in size. Containerships exceeding
9,000 twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs) in
size are now entering some trades, and containerships up to 18,000 TEUs are in the planning
stages. One consequence of larger containerships is the burden that they place on ports,
e.g., port channels often have to be dredged
deeper. How should port dredging be financed?
Should a tax be used? If a user fee is used,
should shipping lines whose ships use the channel pay this fee? Should the user fee be a
national user fee (the same at all ports of a
nation) or a port-specific user fee? How should
the user fee be assessed, e.g., based upon ship
size, type and amount of cargo loaded and
unloaded while in port, or time in port per call?
This article discusses tax and user fee programs for financing port dredging costs. By
doing so, it provides background information
for addressing the above questions. The next
section discusses the U.S. tax and proposed
Clinton Administration national user fee programs for financing port dredging costs. Then,
a port-specific user dredging fee model is presented, followed by a discussion of implementing port-specific user dredging fees. The next
sections discuss external benefits and vessel
cargo in financing port dredging costs. Finally,
a summary of the discussion is presented.
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
Prior to 1986 the costs of the U.S. government's sponsored programs for the deepening
and maintenance of port channels were financed from the federal general tax fund in
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the amount of 65 percent, with state or local
governments being responsible for the remaining 35 percent. In 1986 the U.S. Congress
passed the Water Resources Development Act,
replacing the federal general tax fund with the
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) as
the federal revenue source for financing channel deepening and maintenance costs. The revenue source for the trust fund is the Harbor
Maintenance Tax (HMT), an ad valorem tax
placed on the value of exported, imported, and
some domestic (coast and lake, but generally
excluding inland waterway) cargo moving to
and from U.S. ports. The tax rate was originally
set at 0.04 percent of the value of the cargo.
With the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the rate was increased
to 0.125 percent (effective January 1, 1991).
In 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court declared
the HMT to be in violation of the export clause
of the U.S. Constitution that "No Tax or Duty
shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State" (Article 1, Section 9, Clause 5). As a
result, the HMT collections from exporters
were discontinued as of April 25, 1998-but
remained on imports and certain domestic and
foreign trade zone cargoes. However, in the
same opinion, the Supreme Court also ruled
that exporters are not exempt from user fees
to defray dredging costs. The Court ruled that
a user fee determined by ''the extent and manner of port use depending on factors such as
the size and tonnage of a vessel, the length
of time it spends in port and the services it
requires-for instance, harbor dredging''
would meet the constitutionality test (U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers 2001, 9). The European Union has also been critical of the HMT,
equating the tax to an illegal barrier to their
exports by being in violation of several GA TT
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(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) articles.
In I 999 the Clinton Administration proposed
that the HMTF be replaced with the Harbor
Services Fund (HSF) that would be financed
from a national user fee (i.e., not port-specific)
on commercial vessels. The fee would vary
with vessel size, type, and typical number of
port calls made by a vessel during each U.S.
visit. Vessel type was classified with respect
to general cargo (including container), tanker,
bulk, and passenger vessels. Vessel size was
to be based on the Vessel Capacity Units
(VCUs) of each vessel-the net tonnage of the
vessel adjusted for cargo and passenger spaces
not included in the estimation of the vessel's
net registered tonnage (Kumar 2002). The rationale for using vessel type is that different
types of vessels require different levels of service in port. Containerships, for example, have
tight sailing schedules and thus wish to berth
on arrival. Alternatively, tankers and bulk vessels do not have tight sailing schedules and
thus have greater flexibility in their berthing
schedules. Also, containerships are likely to
visit a number of ports on each U.S. voyage,
unlike tankers and bulk vessels.
Under the Clinton proposal, tankers and bulk
vessels would be levied a user fee for each port
call, whereas general cargo and cruise vessels
would be levied a user fee only for the first
and last ports of call for each U.S. voyage. The
user fee would replace the HMT and the funds
in the HMTF would be transferred to the HSF.
The Clinton Administration argued that the
user fee would meet the constitutionality test
of the U.S. Supreme Court (by linking revenue
collected to services provided in port) and be
consistent with the WTO (World Trade Organization)/GATT obligations toward trading partners. However, facing opposition from such
key port stakeholders as the American Association of Port Authorities and U.S. and foreign
shipping lines, the U.S. Congress did not act
on the proposal. Those in opposition argued
that the proposal would alter the competitive
status quo among U.S. ports and divert cargo
to Canadian and Mexican ports. However, the
primary reason was likely the fact that user
fees would be placed on vessels as opposed to
cargo, as for the HMTF program.
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Both the HMTF and HSF programs are and
would be expected to result in cross-subsidization in financing the nation's port dredging
costs, since the tax rate and user fees do not
or would not vary across ports. The lowerdredging-cost ports are likely cross-subsidizing
or would cross-subsidize the higher-dredgingcost ports-i.e., the surplus HMT revenue (the
HMT revenue collected at a port that exceeds
the government's dredging expenditure at the
port) from a lower-dredging-cost port is used
to cover the deficit HMT revenue (the HMT
revenue collected at a port that is less than the
government's dredging expenditure at the port)
from a higher-dredging-cost port. A lowerdredging-cost port may have a sandy bottom,
whereas a higher-dredging-cost port may have
a rocky bottom. Cross-subsidization among a
nation's ports would also likely occur under
the HSF program.
Since the programs' tax rate and user fees
are the same for all U.S. ports, they do not
necessarily reflect the dredging costs of specific ports and thus would not be expected to
result in a cost-efficient allocation of dredging
resources among U.S. ports. Such a cost-efficient allocation is one for which the deepest
levels of dredged water depths for ports are
obtained for a given national dredging cost
expenditure. Alternatively, if the allocation is
cost inefficient, greater cost will be incurred in
obtaining these levels of dredged water depths.
Consequently, the domestic retail prices for
goods that move through U.S. ports will be
higher than for a cost-efficient allocation, all
else held constant. Furthermore, lower-dredging-cost ports are not being allowed to enjoy to
the fullest extent their comparative advantage.
A

PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEE
MODEL

Rather than having a national tax (e.g., the
HMT) or national user dredging fees (e.g., the
Clinton proposal) to finance port dredging
costs, suppose each port is to establish its own
user fees for financing its dredging costs. The
result might be that higher-dredging-cost ports
charge higher dredging fees per vessel call than
lower-dredging-cost ports, thus placing the former ports at a competitive disadvantage versus
the latter ports. However, this outcome does
not necessarily follow. Higher-dredging-cost
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ports may have a sufficiently large number
of vessel calls that share the dredging costs,
thereby resulting in lower user dredging fees
than at lower-dredging-cost ports that have a
smaller number of vessel calls.
What criteria might be used to establish portspecific user dredging fees? Possible criteria
include the following: ( 1) the revenue from the
fees should cover the dredging cost-no more,
no less, (2) all vessels of the same type and
size that use the channel should pay the same
fee, and (3) the fee for a given type and size
of vessel should not exceed its standalone
dredging cost (i.e., the dredging cost to be incurred when it is the only user of the channel).
If the dredging fee for a given type and size
vessel exceeds its standalone dredging cost, it
follows that the dredged (shared) channel at
the given depth is cost inefficient for this vessel, i.e., this vessel can lower its allocated
dredging cost by having the channel at a diffe~ent depth. This cost inefficiency can be investigated by allocating dredging cost among vessels (that utilize a given dredged channel at a
given depth) based upon a formula or rule that
uses standalone dredging costs, i.e., the rule
can determine the allocated dredging cost for
this channel for a given vessel, which then
can be compared to the vessel's standalone
dredging cost for this channel. 1 The pricing
scheme of establishing prices for the users of
a shared infrastructure or facility based upon
a set of criteria for allocating the shared cost
of the infrastructure or facility among its users
has been referred to in the literature as cost
axiomatic pricing (Talley 1994).
Formulae for allocating shared costs that
consider the standalone costs of the users have
been referred to as alternative capacity rules
(Talley 1988). One such formula is Moriarity's
Rule. Suppose CK is the dredging cost at a
port to be shared among K types and sizes of
vessels. The fraction (fk) of this dredging cost
to be allocated to the number (V k) of vessels
of the kth type and size by Moriarity's Rule
may be expressed as:
fk = C(Vk)/IC(Vk)

(1)

where Ck=C(Vk) is the standalone dredging
cost to be incurred by the number (V k) of vessels of the kth type and size that use the channel.
The product fkCK is the allocated cost share of
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CK (or user fee) to be borne by Qk vessel~. If
there are T vessels of the kth type and size,
the tth individual vessel will be assigned a cost
share or fee of fkCK/ I,Vkt· Moriarity's Rule
satisfies the user fee criteria l and 2 above. It
will also satisfy criterion 3 if fkCK ~ Ck.
Another alternative capacity rule is the
Shapley Value Ruie,2 i.e.,
fk1CK = fk - 1,tCk + [(Ck - ck-1)/ rvktl

(2)

where fkiCK is the cost share (in dollars) of CK
dredging cost to be borne by the tth ~ndividu~l
vessel (V kt) of the kth type and size; fkt 1s
the cost share expressed as a fraction. As for
Moriarity' s Rule , Ck is the standalone cost for
the kth type of vessel and size. If the kth type
of vessel and size is the largest among the K
types and sizes, then Ck = CK. Further, the kl type and size vessel is smaller in size t~an
the kth type and size; the k-2 type and size
vessel is smaller in size than the k-1 type
and size.
By the Shapley Value Rule, the cost allocations (or user fees) of the dredging cost CK
among the vessels that utilize the channel are
determined as follows: For k=l (or the smallest) vessel size, the cost C 1 (or the standalone
dredging cost for the smallest size vessel) is
divided equally among all vessels that use the
channel; the difference between the standalone
costs for the smallest vessel size and the next
largest vessel size (C 2 - C 1) is divided among
all ships except the smallest size v~sse_l;. and
so on until the last cost increment 1s d1v1ded
only among the vessels of the largest size. ~he
Shapley Value Rule satisfies the ~ser fe~ cr~teria l and 2 above. It will also satisfy cntenon
3 if fkCK ~ Ck. The Shapley Value Rule has
been used in practice for determining aircraft
landing fees at airports.
IMPLEMENTING PORT-SPECIFIC USER
DREDGING FEES

There are two types of dredging costs: construction and maintenance. Construction costs
may be those incurred in the initial dredging
of a waterway, e.g., when a waterway of natural
depth of thirty feet is dredged to a depth of forty
feet. Construction costs for this same waterway
will be also incurred at a subsequent time period if the waterway is dredged to a depth of
forty-five feet. Maintenance dredging costs are
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incurred when dredging is done to maintain
the dredged waterway at a given depth, e.g.,
at forty-five feet.
User fees can be used to allocate the construction dredging costs of a waterway among
the vessels that use the waterway. However, if
alternative capacity rules are used to allocate
these costs and thus determine the fees, only
those vessels for which the dredging of the
waterway is necessary (i.e., dredging deeper
than the natural depth or dredging a dredged
waterway at a deeper depth) would share in
the construction dredging costs. For example,
only those vessels that require that the waterway be dredged from an initial natural depth of
thirty to forty feet would share in the dredging
construction cost. If larger vessels in the future
wish to use the waterway but require a deeper
waterway depth of forty-five feet, only these
vessels would share in this construction cost.
Alternatively, those vessels for which the natural depth of the waterway is sufficient would
not be allocated a share of the dredging construction costs. Note that these results differ
for allocating runway construction costs among
landing airplanes at an airport. Since there is
no natural runway, assuming the runway has
to be paved, all airplanes that utilize (land on
and take off from) the runway would share in
the construction costs of the runway.
Assuming that without maintenance dredging the waterway would eventually return to
its natural depth, all vessels that require water
depths greater than the natural depth would be
allocated maintenance dredging costs. If there
is a steady-state dredged depth greater than the
natural depth, i.e., a depth that remains without
maintenance dredging, then only those ships
that require a deeper depth would share in the
maintenance dredging cost.
Port-specific user dredging fees for a nation
will allow lower-dredging-cost ports to take
advantage of their comparative advantage in
dredging. However, the port-specific user fees
at some ports in a nation may be higher or
lower than a national tax or national user fee
program. Port-specific user dredging fees are
expected to provide for a more cost-efficient
allocation of resources for dredging a nation's
ports as opposed to a national tax or national
user fee program. Dredging resources at
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higher-dredging-cost ports may move to lowerdredging-cost ports. The lowering of a nation's
port dredging costs, in tum, may result in lower
domestic retail prices for goods that move
through its ports.
PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEES AND
NON-USERS

Heretofore, it has been implicitly assumed
that the benefits of a dredged channel accrue
only to the users (i.e., vessels) of the channel.
However, non-users may also benefit from the
dredged channel, i.e., external benefits or positive spillover effects exist. If so, the public
finance literature suggests that these non-users
should also share in the cost of dredging the
channel. If non-user benefits accrue to the general public, then government should subsidize
the dredging costs (Rosen 1985).
The total demand for a dredged port channel
is the sum of the user and non-user demands.
The share of dredging cost to be borne by
non-users (or government) should reflect the
proportion of non-user demand to total demand. Alternatively, the share of the dredging
cost to be borne by users (or vessels) should
reflect the proportion of user demand to total
demand. This cost share can then be allocated
among individual users (or vessels) as described above by port-specific user dredging
fees.
PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEES AND
VESSEL CARGO

Heretofore, it has also been implicitly assumed that the amount of cargo (or passengers)
carried by a vessel has no effect on the amount
of waterway water that the vessel draws. However, in reality, a vessel will draw more water
and thus require a deeper channel as the amount
of cargo transported increases. The amount of
cargo transported by a vessel can be incorporated into our port-specific user dredging fee
model above by replacing Vko the tth individual
vessel of the kth type and size, with Vktr, the
tth individual vessel of the kth type and size
transporting ''r'' tonnage of cargo. If there are
ranges of ''r'' that affect the amount of water
that a vessel draws, constraints on ''r'' will
have to be imposed. For example, there may
be an initial range of cargo tonnage that does
not affect the amount of water that a vessel
draws.
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It is interesting to note that with the inclusion
of cargo in the above model, the user dredging
fee model now becomes a user (or vessel) and
cargo dredging fee model, assuming that cargo
is allocated the cost of dredging attributable to
the increase in water (or dredged) depth required by a given vessel in transporting "r"
tonnage of cargo. Note that the "r" cargo tonnage would include the weight of the wrapping
or boxing of cargo, e.g., the weight of skids
for breakbulk cargo or the weight of containers
for containerized cargo. Further, the model provides theoretical support for allocating port
dredging costs on vessels and cargo.
SUMMARY

In 1986 the U.S. Congress passed the Water
Resources Development Act, replacing the federal general tax fund with the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) as the federal revenue source for financing the construction and
maintenance dredging costs of port channels.
The revenue source for this trust fund is the
Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT), an ad valorem tax placed on the value of cargo. However, in 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court declared
the HMT to be in violation of the export clause
of the Constitution. In 1999 the Clinton Administration proposed that the HMTF be replaced
with the Harbor Services Fund (HSF) to be
financed from a national port user fee placed
on commercial vessels that call at U.S. ports.
Facing opposition from key port stakeholders,
the U.S. Congress did not act on this proposal.
The stakeholders argued that the proposal
would alter the competitive status quo among
U.S. ports and divert cargo to Canadian and
Mexican ports. Both the HMTF and HSF programs are and would be expected to result in
the cross-subsidization in the finance of U.S.
port dredging costs, since the tax rate and user
fees do not or would not vary across ports.
Port-specific user dredging fees will allow
lower-cost-dredging ports to make the most
of their comparative advantage, as opposed to
national tax and user fee dredging programs.
They would also provide for a more cost-efficient allocation of the dredging resources
among a nation's ports. The lowering of a nation's port dredging costs, in tum, may result
in lower domestic retail prices for goods that
move through a nation's ports. However, these
fees are likely to vary across the nation's ports.
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The port-specific user dredging fee model
presented in this article has provided a theoretical framework for implementing port-specific
user dredging fees that satisfy the criteria: (I)
the revenue from the fees should cover the
dredging costs-no more, no less, (2) all vessels of the same type and size that use a given
dredged waterway should pay the same fee,
and (3) the fee for a given type and size of
vessel should not exceed its standalone dredging cost, thereby promoting cost efficiency in
dredging. Further, the model provides theoretical support for non-users who benefit from
dredged waterways and vessel cargo to be involved in the financing of port dredging costs.
ENDNOTES
1

If the cost allocations of a port's dredged

channel (at a given depth) among vessels that
utilize this channel are core allocations, then
the channel will be the least costly dredged
channel at the port to be shared by the vessels.
Three conditions must be satisfied for the cost
allocations to be core cost allocations. The
Condition of Group Rationality states that the
sum of the cost allocations must equal the
dredging cost that is allocated. The Condition
of Individual Rationality states that the dredging cost allocation assigned to a given vessel
must be no greater than its corresponding (for
the same channel) standalone dredging cost.
The Condition of Coalition Rationality states
that the sum of the cost allocations assigned
to any sub-group of vessels that use the channel
must be no greater than the cost to be incurred
in providing an exclusive dredged channel (for
the same channel) for this sub-group of vessels.
If one or more of these conditions are not satisfied, then the dredged channel at the given
depth is cost inefficient for at least one of the
vessels, i.e., a vessel can lower its allocated
dredging cost by having the channel at a different depth. In our discussion, we have assumed
that cost inefficiency arises when the Condition
of Individual Rationality is not satisfied. However, it may also arise when the Condition of
Coalition Rationality is not satisfied.
2
For further discussion of the Shapley Value
Rule see Talley (1988).
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